Opportunities for buyers to negotiate discounts can blunt competition in the initial posting of prices. It is always an equilibrium for identical suppliers to post price at the common marginal cost. If few buyers have opportunities to bargain, this equilibrium is unique. If many buyers have bargaining opportunities, however, a second equilibrium emerges in which suppliers post the monopoly price and then negotiate discounts individually with buyers. In this equilibrium, discounted prices are above marginal cost and profits increase with concentration. Advance price announcements may help suppliers coordinate onto their preferred equilibrium of posting the monopoly price.
Introduction
In a number of industries, suppliers post prices and then negotiate discounts off list with individual buyers. Advance price announcements, in which suppliers publish price changes ahead of their effective dates, are also common. These pricing practices have raised concerns as possibly facilitating collusion (e.g., Grether and Plott, 1984; Borenstein, 1994; Gillespie, 1995) . How do opportunities for discounting affect market pricing? Selective discounting can of course undermine collusively set prices (Stigler, 1964) . Cooper (1986) and Holt and Scheffman (1987) show that most-favored-customer and best-price provisions can support high posted prices by discouraging selective discounts. Yet recent research in laboratory markets finds seemingly contrary results on the effect of discounting. Introducing opportunities for consumers to bargain for discounts often leads to market outcomes less favorable for consumers. Cason et al. (2003) find that transaction prices are higher in "haggle" markets, where suppliers post prices but consumers can negotiate discounts, than in pure posted-offer markets. Davis and Holt (1994) similarly find that when opportunities for discounting are introduced into a posted-offer market, suppliers uniformly raise their list prices, sometimes dramatically, and net prices are high. This paper develops a simple model that can explain such patterns. Identical suppliers post prices noncooperatively in an initial period, after which (some) buyers have an opportunity to approach a supplier and engage in an alternating-offers bargaining game. Posted prices affect the bargaining subgame in two ways. First, the option to buy at the lowest posted price serves as a buyer's threat-point in bargaining for a discount. The higher the lowest posted price, the worse a buyer's position in bargaining with any supplier. Second, a supplier's posted price determines the supplier's attractiveness as a bargaining partner. In particular, a high posted price makes a supplier an attractive bargaining partner, by putting the supplier in a poor bargaining position (relative to rivals posting the lowest price). This creates an incentive for suppliers to post high prices to attract buyers seeking discounts. This incentive runs counter to the more familiar incentive suppliers have to post low prices to capture sales to buyers who do not have bargaining opportunities and so buy at posted price.
It is always an equilibrium for identical suppliers to post price at the common marginal cost. If the proportion of buyers with bargaining opportunities is large enough, however, a second equilibrium emerges in which all suppliers post the monopoly price and subsequently negotiate discounts with individual buyers.
1 In this equilibrium, discounted prices are strictly above marginal cost and supplier profits increase with concentration. Advance price announcements may thus help suppliers coordinate onto their preferred equilibrium of posting the monopoly price.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model setting, while Section 3 describes equilibrium. Possible implications for competition policy and extensions to the model are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Economic Setting
There are 2 ≥ N suppliers producing a homogeneous good at the common
, and there is a continuum of consumers of measure one, each of whom has unit demand for the good at the common reservation value c v > . The game is played over an infinite number of periods, indexed by t . Suppliers (indexed by
, every consumer has, with independent probability θ , an opportunity to make an offer to a chosen supplier. If the chosen supplier rejects a given consumer's offer, then with probability θ the supplier can make a counter-offer to the consumer at 2 = t . Play between a paired consumer and supplier proceeds in this way as an alternating-offers bargaining game with exogenous probability of breakdown (Binmore et al., 1986) . The consumer (supplier) makes an offer t p in every odd-(even-) numbered period, until either an offer is accepted or (with probability θ − 1 in each period) the opportunity for further negotiation ends. The structure of the game is common knowledge.
There is no discounting of the future. If an offer t p is accepted in any period t , the negotiating consumer receives a payoff of If n suppliers offer a lowest posted price L p no greater than v , a consumer buying at posted price chooses among these suppliers with equal probability n 1 .
Likewise, if m suppliers post some price p and a consumer with an opportunity to negotiate prefers to bargain with a supplier posting p , the consumer chooses a bargaining partner among these suppliers with equal probability m 1 .
To sum up: (1) the 
Equilibrium
If the lowest price posted in 0 = t is c , all consumers purchase at price c in
. If the lowest posted price L p is no greater than v but strictly above c , then the proportion θ of consumers with an opportunity to negotiate will make price offers in
. In subgame perfect equilibrium, every negotiating consumer will make an offer that leaves the chosen supplier indifferent between accepting the offer and rejecting it in 2 Alternatively, suppose every consumer has a "special" good, with reservation value . With δ small, a consumer will buy at the negotiated discount even if another supplier is revealed to offer the special good. Nor is delay to resolve the uncertainty worthwhile given the probability of breakdown. In this setting, the posited threat is not credible: the supplier with whom negotiations have broken down may turn out to have the consumer's special good.
order to make a counter-offer with probability θ in 
if negotiations break down, because the consumer is assumed to buy with equal probability from among the n suppliers posting L p .
Bargaining with a High-Posted-Price Supplier
Take first the case of a consumer bargaining with a supplier that has posted a high price. In odd-numbered period t , the consumer offers a transaction price of t p , such that
where
is the optimal counter-offer the supplier would make in period 1 + t conditional on rejecting the consumer's offer of t p in t . In subgame perfect equilibrium, the counter-offer 1 + t p would be accepted by the consumer, yielding the supplier a payoff
. This payoff would be realized with the probability θ that negotiations continue. Otherwise the supplier's payoff from the given consumer would be zero, given that the consumer would purchase elsewhere at the lower posted price L p . The supplier is thus indifferent between accepting and rejecting the consumer's offer of t p in equation (1), and so t p is the lowest offer the supplier would accept.
The highest offer the consumer would accept in period 1 + t is given by
where 2 + t p is the optimal counter-offer the consumer would make in 2 + t conditional on rejecting the supplier's offer of 1 + t p . In subgame perfect equilibrium,
That is, the parties' optimal offers and counter-offers do not change across periods.
Substituting (3) into (2), the supplier's optimal offer in 1 + t can be written as
Substituting (4) into (1) 
If a consumer were to offer the price t p given in equation (5) to a supplier that has posted a high price, the supplier would accept immediately in period t .
Bargaining with a Low-Posted-Price Supplier
Now consider the case of a consumer bargaining with a supplier whose posted price is the low price L p . In contrast with equation (1), the lowest offer the consumer could make in t that the supplier would accept is now given by
where the second set of terms on the right-hand side of equation (6) reflects the n 1 chance that the supplier would sell to the given consumer at posted price L p if the supplier were to reject offer t p and negotiations were to break down. Substituting (4) into (6) and solving for t p , the buyer's offer in t can be written as
An offer of t p given by equation (7) made to a supplier that has posted the low price L p would be accepted immediately in period t .
Equilibrium Posted Prices
By posting a high price, a supplier puts itself in a poor bargaining position and so makes itself an attractive bargaining partner, as shown presently.
Lemma 1. If suppliers were to post differing prices, buyers that have an opportunity to negotiate discounts would choose high-posted-price suppliers as bargaining partners
over suppliers posting the low price L p .
Proof: From equations (6) and (7), a buyer pays a lower negotiated price by bargaining with a high-posted-price supplier than by bargaining with a supplier that has posted the low price. Q.E.D.
The intuition underlying Lemma 1 is that if negotiations with a high-posted-price supplier were to break down, the supplier would lose the sale to the given buyer with certainty. In contrast, a supplier posting the low price L p would still sell to the given buyer with probability n 1 if negotiations were to break down, where n is the number of suppliers posting L p . Thus a high-posted-price supplier is in a poor bargaining position and so is more attractive to buyers as a bargaining partner. Lemma 1 establishes an incentive for suppliers to post high prices, and indicates that this incentive is stronger the greater the proportion of consumers with bargaining opportunities. 
Equilibrium Discounted Price
and the posted price is c p > , the discounted price paid by negotiating buyers, p , can be obtained from equation (7) 
(i)
The discounted price paid by negotiating buyers is c p > .
(ii)
The discounted price p increases with θ and decreases with N .
Proof: Subtracting c from equation (9), the margin earned on sales to negotiating buyers can be written as
which completes the proof of part (i). For proof of part (ii), differentiate equation (10) with respect to θ :
Finally, the discounted price decreases with N by inspection of equation (9). Q.E.D.
Intuitively, increasing θ tends to improve a supplier's bargaining position by making it more likely that the supplier would have an opportunity to make a counter-offer after rejecting a buyer's initial offer. with θ . While p increases with θ given the greater chance the supplier has to make a counteroffer, this is more than offset by the lower proportion of buyers purchasing at p . The model could be modified so that the proportion of buyers having an opportunity to make an initial discount offer is distinct from the continuation probability that a supplier can make a counteroffer. In such a setting, raising just the proportion of buyers with bargaining opportunities would certainly lower supplier profits (so long as 
Discussion
The modeling results can be summarized as follows. Any given supplier sees an upside as well as a downside to posting a high price. Posting a price higher than rivals' posted prices loses sales to buyers that have no bargaining opportunities and so transact at has also raised concerns that it may facilitate collusion (e.g., Grether and Plott, 1984; Borenstein, 1994; Gillespie, 1995) . Collusion concerns are tempered by recognition that secret discounting can unravel a cartel agreement.
In the present modeling context, effective coordination might be limited to suppliers choosing among noncooperative equilibria of the game; it need not involve an agreement to refrain from discounting. Such limited coordination might, nevertheless, raise prices substantially above marginal cost. Let ) , ( N θ μ be the margin suppliers earn on sales at the negotiated price p , as a fraction of the monopoly margin:
. By equation (10), this equilibrium margin is 4 Blair and Romano (2002) show that when advance price announcements resolve cost uncertainty, both profits and consumer surplus rise. , a four-to-three merger would raise net price by 2.6%, and a three-to-two merger would raise net price by about 5%.
Commitment Power
In a narrow bargaining context, the ability to commit to an offer is advantageous.
Greater commitment power typically allows the committed party to capture more of the joint surplus from trade (e.g., Schelling, 1960; Crawford, 1982; Muthoo, 1996; Kambe, 1999) . In the broader context of market equilibrium, however, such commitment power is 
Selective Discounts
Suppliers are rather passive with respect to discounting in the model. Buyers with bargaining opportunities take the initiative in choosing bargaining partners and making discount offers. However, suppliers might also seek out buyers that have no bargaining opportunities and offer them selective discounts. Such supplier-initiated discounting could be profitable if suppliers could distinguish between buyer types well enough. Corts (1998) shows that, in an oligopoly market, third-degree price discrimination can intensify competition, lowering suppliers' profits and raising the surplus of every consumer type.
A similar result holds in the present context. If selective discounting initiated by suppliers were individually profitable, a high-posted-price equilibrium could not be sustained.
Let γ be the probability with which a supplier could correctly identify a given buyer as lacking bargaining opportunities. Note that θ γ − ≥ 1 , the equality being strict if the supplier cannot distinguish buyer types better than a random draw. Now consider the case of ) ( * N θ θ ≥ and equilibrium posted price c p > . A supplier could profitably deviate from the posited equilibrium if the supplier could accurately identify which buyers lack bargaining opportunities and selectively offer just these buyers a price slightly below p .
6 With probability γ , such an offer would be received by a buyer that lacks bargaining opportunities, in which case the supplier would increase the likelihood (from N 1 to 1) of selling to the buyer at price p (less the vanishingly small discount offered). With probability γ − 1 the supplier would err, the offer being received by a buyer with bargaining opportunities. In this case, by Lemma 1, the supplier would lose the N 1 chance of selling to the buyer at the negotiated price p . Altogether, the increment to a supplier's expected profit from sending a selective offer would be
Substituting equation (10) into expression (13), note that expression (13) . 6 Here the lack of bargaining opportunities by a buyer is interpreted as the supplier having the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. If suppliers were adept enough at identifying buyer types, selective discounting could be profitable, in which case a posted price above marginal cost could not be sustained; posting c p = would be the unique equilibrium.
Bargaining Opportunities
Buyer bargaining opportunities have so far been treated as exogenous. Such opportunities of course depend on market characteristics. For example, the search costs facing buyers wishing to engage in serial discount negotiations may decline with the number of suppliers in the market. The ability to negotiate discounts also depends on such factors as a buyer's risk-aversion, impatience and outside options. The more these factors are associated with observable buyer characteristics, such as buyer size, the more information suppliers would tend to have on which to base selective discounts.
A growing literature has explored how buyer size may affect the prices buyers obtain. One strand of this literature involves models of bilateral and multilateral bargaining in which the parties split the increment to total surplus from their reaching a deal. Papers in this vein include Horn and Wolinsky (1988) , Stole and Zweibel (1996a,b) , Chipty and Snyder (1999) , Inderst and Wey (2003) and Raskovich (2003) . These authors all find that larger buyers do not necessarily negotiate lower prices. The relationship between buyer size and price depends on the curvature of total surplus with respect to the volume of trade. If increments to total surplus diminish (grow) at the margin, a buyer's bargaining leverage falls (rises) with the size of the buyer's purchase requirements. Raskovich (2003) further shows that if a buyer is so large as to be pivotal to a supplier's entry decision, the buyer is in a worse bargaining position vis-à-vis the supplier than are smaller, non-pivotal buyers whose purchases have no effect on the supplier's decision to sink costs. 8 Experimental work by Normann et al. (2005) supports these conclusions, finding that large buyers receive discounts only in the case of increasing marginal costs (concave surplus function).
Concluding Remarks
Opportunities for buyers to negotiate discounts can affect competition in postedoffer markets in a surprising way. If the pool of buyers with bargaining opportunities is large enough, competition to attract such buyers can lead suppliers in a "race to the top" to post a high price in equilibrium. Given that it is also (always) an equilibrium for identical suppliers to post price at common marginal cost, advance price announcements might help suppliers to coordinate onto their preferred equilibrium of posting the monopoly price. Such (limited) coordination is stable because the agreed-upon posted price is a noncooperative equilibrium. When posted price is high in the market outcome, discounting off will be pervasive and vigorous, yet negotiated prices will remain well above marginal cost. In this case, a merger of homogeneous good suppliers could result in a significant increase in net prices.
given that the proportion θ − 1 of buyers would pay posted price p and θ would pay the negotiated price p in the candidate subgame perfect equilibrium. Adapting equation (7) 
Substituting (A2) into (A1) and simplifying yields
If a supplier were to post a price an arbitrarily small amount below p , the supplier would sell to all
buyers that have no bargaining opportunities, but would sell to no other buyer, earning profit of
The increment to profit from undercutting p is then 
